



Reform Watch Mid-Term Report February-July 2026

Monitoring reform progress, political developments, and implementation trends in Bangladesh.



Centre for
Governance Studies

Reform Watch Mid-Term Report (February-July 2026)

*Monitoring Reform Progress, Political Developments, and Implementation
Trends in Bangladesh*

Reform Watch: Monitoring Reform Progress, Political Developments, and Implementation Trends in Bangladesh

Mid-Term Report

February-July 2026

<https://reform-watch.com/>

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
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Executive Summary

This midterm report reviews implementation of the July National Charter 2025 from February to July 2026, during the first phase of the BNP-led government under Prime Minister Tarique Rahman. The Charter was negotiated through the National Consensus Commission with 33 political parties and alliances. It contains 84 provisions, which Reform Watch has divided into 114 trackable items across eight areas: constitutional reform, electoral reform, the legislature, the judiciary, public administration, police reform, anti-corruption reform, and local government institutions. Each item is classified as Pending, Ongoing, Partially Adopted, Fully Adopted, or Binned.

Status Distribution — All 114 Provisions



At the halfway point of the twelve-month monitoring period, no provision has been Fully Adopted in a way that matches both the process and substance set out in the Charter. Of the 114 trackable items, 81 (71.1 per cent) remain Pending, 17 (14.9 per cent) are Partially Adopted, 9 (7.9 per cent) are Ongoing, and 7 (6.1 per cent) are Binned.

Figure 1: Implementation status by reform area across all 114 provisions

The 17 Partially Adopted items comprise 16 sub-provisions under Provision 16 on the caretaker government system and Provision 27 on constituency boundary delimitation. The caretaker system was restored through Supreme Court rulings in March and July 2026, while Parliament passed delimitation legislation in April. In both cases, action was taken toward the Charter's objective, but not through the constitutional mechanism specified in the Charter. Most documented activity is concentrated in constitutional reform, the legislature, and the judiciary. Public administration and local government institutions, by contrast, recorded no activity during the reporting period.




Figure 2: Implementation status by reform area across all 114 provisions

Several findings stand out. Seven provisions are classified as Binned. Five of them, covering judicial appointments, the Supreme Court Secretariat, Bar Association elections, the Independent Police Commission, and appointments to the Anti-Corruption Commission, were affected by Parliament's review of 133 interim-government ordinances between April and May 2026. Four of the seven Binned provisions had no recorded dissent from any signatory party. Short-term provisions, which did not depend on constitutional amendment, produced particularly weak results: four were Binned and two were Partially Adopted. Provision 3, on the constitutional amendment procedure, remains the main procedural obstacle because the government and opposition disagree over the mechanism for reform. In the areas of women's representation and anti-corruption, most public activity came from civil society rather than from formal legislative or executive action.

The second half of the monitoring year may clarify whether these patterns continue. The Appellate Division is scheduled to hear the Supreme Court Secretariat case in September 2026, and future parliamentary sessions may reopen the constitutional amendment process. Reform Watch will continue to monitor all 114 items and will publish its final report in January 2027.

Introduction

This report covers Reform Watch's monitoring of the July National Charter 2025 from February to July 2026. Developed by the Centre for Governance Studies (CGS), Reform Watch tracks progress on the democratic reform commitments contained in the Charter. The report draws on

five monthly updates published between February and June 2026, together with developments recorded through the end of July. Its sources include parliamentary proceedings, cabinet decisions, court records, government documents, newspaper reports, statements by political parties, and civil society responses.

The monitoring period began after the new Parliament was sworn in and Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's cabinet took office on 17 February 2026. In the 13th National Parliamentary Election, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party won 209 seats and Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami became the second-largest party with 68 seats. A referendum held alongside the election endorsed the July National Charter, with about 68.6 per cent of voters supporting its reform agenda. The government therefore entered office with a parliamentary majority, while the Charter carried a separate referendum mandate.

The July National Charter emerged from several months of negotiations led by the National Consensus Commission and involving 33 political parties and alliances. Its 84 provisions cover constitutional reform, electoral reform, the legislature, the judiciary, public administration, police reform, anti-corruption reform, and local government institutions. For monitoring purposes, Reform Watch divides these commitments into 114 provisions and sub-provisions. The five status indicators measure both formal action and the extent to which that action follows the Charter's intended process and objectives.

The referendum did not resolve how the Charter would be implemented. Debate soon shifted to questions of legal procedure, constitutional compatibility, sequencing, and institutional authority. The BNP-led government has argued that reforms should proceed through Parliament and the existing constitutional amendment process, including a special parliamentary committee. Jamaat-e-Islami and the National Citizen Party have instead called for a Constitutional Reform Council, arguing that an ordinary parliamentary committee would not fulfil the referendum mandate. The disagreement remained unresolved throughout the reporting period. The opposition declined to join the proposed committee, organised public programmes, and submitted memoranda to the Speaker.

The report examines these developments provision by provision, identifies the main political, legal, and institutional factors affecting implementation, and assesses the position of the reform agenda at the midpoint of the monitoring year. The final report, due in January 2027, will review developments during the second half of the period and revise the assessments where necessary.

Scope of the Study

The study is limited to implementation of the July National Charter 2025. Reform Watch uses the Charter as its main benchmark because it consolidates selected recommendations from the reform commissions, records party positions, and identifies areas of agreement, disagreement, and formal dissent. It does not attempt to monitor every recommendation made by the reform commissions or every reform initiative pursued outside the Charter framework.

The assessment considers both formal progress and the direction of implementation. It asks whether action by the government, Parliament, the courts, or other institutions follows the procedure and objectives set out in the Charter. It also records delays, political disputes, legal challenges, partial implementation, and reversals.

The study does not assess the government's overall performance, the full manifesto of any political party, or wider socio-economic policy unless it directly relates to a Charter provision. It also does not use surveys or interviews to measure public opinion. The analysis is based on documentary evidence and qualitative review.

Methodology

Reform Watch uses a qualitative, indicator-based framework to monitor implementation of the July National Charter 2025. The analysis combines documentary review, legal and institutional analysis, process tracing, and qualitative content analysis. This allows the report to examine both whether action occurred and whether it followed the procedure and objectives set out in the Charter.

Although the Charter contains 84 primary provisions, Reform Watch divides them into 114 trackable items. This was necessary because parties often agreed with one part of a provision while dissenting from another. Tracking sub-provisions separately preserves those distinctions. Each item is assigned one of five statuses: Pending, Ongoing, Partially Adopted, Fully Adopted, or Binned. The assessment draws on parliamentary records, cabinet decisions, court developments, government announcements, gazette notifications, credible news reports, and civil society responses.

The Charter drew mainly on six reform commissions: the Constitution Reform Commission, Electoral Reform Commission, Judiciary Reform Commission, Public Administration Reform Commission, Police Reform Commission, and Anti-Corruption Commission Reform Commission. Its provisions, however, extend beyond those commission headings. Reform Watch therefore groups the 114 items into eight reform areas: constitutional reform, electoral reform, the legislature, the judiciary, public administration, police reform, anti-corruption reform, and local government institutions.

a) Methodological Approach

The assessment uses four related methods.

First, the official government-distributed text of the July National Charter was reviewed to establish the baseline for each provision. Relevant ordinances, laws, parliamentary records, court orders, cabinet decisions, ministry circulars, and institutional decisions were then examined to determine whether each item had moved along its required legal, constitutional, administrative, or policy pathway.

Second, each provision and sub-provision is tracked over time. The review records whether it remained inactive, entered discussion, was partly addressed, was fully implemented, or was abandoned in substance.

Third, process tracing is used to reconstruct the sequence of developments behind each status. This is important because implementation may involve political negotiation, parliamentary procedure, cabinet decisions, court review, and public debate.

Fourth, qualitative content analysis is applied to statements by government and opposition figures, parliamentary debates, party positions, civil society responses, credible media reports, and expert commentary. This helps identify how political actors interpret the Charter and whether their positions change over time.

Taken together, these methods provide the basis for assessing implementation in both procedural and substantive terms.

b) Classification of Provisions

Each provision and sub-provision is also classified by its expected implementation pathway. Short-term provisions are generally those that can be carried out within one to two years through administrative, executive, or policy action. Long-term provisions usually require constitutional amendment, major legislation, institutional restructuring, or broader political agreement and may take three years or more. This distinction helps separate delays caused by complexity from those linked to political will, institutional capacity, procedural uncertainty, or legal constraints.

c) Status Indicators

Statuses are updated using evidence from parliamentary sittings, cabinet meetings, government decisions, court proceedings, institutional announcements, credible news outlets, and civil society organisations. Each item is placed in one of five categories:

1. **Pending** means there has been no meaningful action, decision, or active discussion on that provision.

2. **Ongoing** means the provision has entered discussion or shows some movement toward implementation, but no final adoption has occurred yet.
3. **Partially Adopted** means the main objective of the provision has been addressed, though not in the exact form, procedure, or institutional design set out in the July National Charter 2025.
4. **Fully Adopted** means the provision has been implemented in line with the Charter's intended process and substance.
5. **Binned** means the original stated objective of the provision has effectively been discarded during implementation.

The categories are intended to reflect both the existence and the quality of action. An item may be Partially Adopted when its main objective has been addressed through a different procedure or institutional design. It may be Binned when later action reverses, neutralises, or abandons the purpose of the original commitment.

d) Evidence Collection and Verification

Official sources are used wherever available, including parliamentary records, cabinet decisions, gazette notifications, ministry statements, court proceedings, budget documents, and institutional announcements. These are supplemented by credible newspaper reports, statements by political parties, civil society responses, and expert commentary.

Each development is assessed against the relevant provision or sub-provision. The tracker therefore records not only that an event took place, but also whether it represents progress, delay, deviation, or reversal in relation to the Charter.

Statuses are reviewed regularly and may change as new evidence emerges. A provision may move from Pending to Ongoing, from Ongoing to Partially Adopted, or from Ongoing to Binned depending on subsequent developments.

e) Interpretation and Accountability

The assessment considers substance as well as form. Some provisions may be implemented formally but weakened in practice, while others may remain in political discussion without moving toward legal or institutional adoption.

This approach also helps identify wider patterns, including delays in constitutional reform, reliance on administrative measures instead of legislation, disputes over implementation mechanisms, reversals of interim-government reforms, and gaps between political commitments and institutional action.

Tracking each provision separately provides a clear record of which reforms are moving forward, which remain stalled, which are contested, and which have been diluted or abandoned.

Limitations of the Study

Several limitations should be kept in mind when reading this report and the monthly updates on which it is based.

The study is bounded by the July National Charter. Reforms pursued outside the Charter, whether through executive action, judicial interpretation, or political negotiation, are not included unless they relate directly to a tracked provision. This is a deliberate methodological choice, but it means the report is not a complete account of all reform activity in Bangladesh during the period.

The study also relies substantially on media reporting. Official records, cabinet decisions, gazette notifications, and court documents are prioritised, but they are not always available in full or in a timely manner. Media coverage may reflect editorial bias, political pressure, and uneven geographic attention. Developments outside Dhaka or within administrative processes that receive little public coverage may therefore be underrepresented.

The monitoring period began immediately after a change of government, in a political and institutional setting that remained fluid. Developments sometimes moved faster than the monthly update cycle. The classifications should therefore be read as assessments based on the evidence available at a particular point in time, not as final judgments.

This report includes evidence assessed through 31 July 2026. Later developments will be covered in subsequent monthly updates and in the final report.

Monthly monitoring can also produce uneven coverage across reform areas. Provisions receive more attention when they become politically active, while quieter areas may receive less coverage. The frequency with which a reform area appears in the monthly updates should not be treated as a direct measure of its actual pace of implementation.

Finally, status classifications require interpretation. The distinction between Partially Adopted and Binned can be difficult when an initiative addresses part of a commitment but departs from its intended purpose or procedure. The classifications in this report are evidence-based analytical judgments made by the principal investigator and may be revised as further information becomes available.

This is a midterm assessment rather than a final evaluation. The first five months provide enough evidence to identify early patterns, but many provisions remain at an initial stage. The conclusions will be reviewed and, where necessary, revised in the final report scheduled for January 2027.

Areas of Progress (Ongoing and Partially Adopted)

Documented activity was limited. Of the 114 trackable items, 19 distinct provisions showed some form of activity: 9 Ongoing, 3 Partially Adopted, and 7 Binned. This section discusses the 12 provisions that recorded positive or incremental movement. Most are connected to constitutional and legislative reform, where political pressure after the July uprising pushed the government to engage with the Charter.

Even within this group, progress was uneven. Several provisions remained at the discussion stage, and others moved forward through a process different from the one set out in the Charter.




Figure 3: Reform Area Distribution*

Activity is concentrated in a small number of reform areas. The legislature accounts for six Ongoing provisions. Constitutional reform includes both Ongoing and Partially Adopted items, while electoral reform appears only in the Partially Adopted category. The judiciary and anti-corruption areas each have one Ongoing provision. The distribution shows that progress has not extended across the wider Charter agenda.

** Note: Provision 16 (Caretaker Government System) and its 15 active sub-provisions are represented as a single entry in this chart. The live Reform Watch tracker records each sub-provision individually, which accounts for the difference between the 3 Partially Adopted provisions shown here and the 17 Partially Adopted items reflected in the overall status distribution*

1. Constitution

a) Non-Party Caretaker Government System

Provision 16 calls for a constitutional amendment restoring the non-partisan caretaker government system. Its 21 sub-provisions set out the formation, composition, and tenure of an election-time administration, including a Chief Adviser Selection Committee, a ranked-choice appointment process, the participation of parliamentary and, where necessary, judicial members, and timelines for each stage. The Charter therefore treats restoration as a legislative and constitutional process rather than only a judicial one.

Charter Provision 16*	Caretaker Government System
Indicator	Partially Adopted
Agreed Parties	30 political parties and alliances agreed: (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (27), (28), (30), (31), (32), and (33)*.
Disagreed Parties	N/A
Dissent Notes	N/A
Timeline	Long-term

Table 1: Provision 16 Status and Description

The non-party caretaker government system was first introduced in Bangladesh through the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1996, under the BNP-led government, in response to opposition demands for a neutral interim authority to oversee national elections. The system remained in place for three election cycles before being abolished in 2011 through the Fifteenth

**Provision 16 contains 21 sub-provisions. Sub-provisions 16(1) through 16(15), which govern the formation and selection process for the caretaker government, are assessed as Partially Adopted. Sub-provisions 16(16) through 16(21), which govern tenure and operational arrangements, remain Pending as they are contingent on the legislative completion of the formation framework*

**The numerical codes in the Agreed Parties, Disagreed Parties, and Dissent Notes fields correspond to the political parties and alliances participating in the formulation of the July National Charter 2025. A full list of parties and their corresponding codes is provided in the Annex of this report. "This note applies to all provision status tables throughout this report."*

Amendment under the Awami League government, following a Supreme Court ruling that declared it unconstitutional, though allowing its continuation for two further election cycles in the interest of political stability. The abolition removed Articles 58B through 58D from the Constitution, eliminating the legal basis for the caretaker framework entirely. Elections were subsequently conducted under the incumbent government, with the Election Commission designated as the primary guarantor of fairness, an arrangement that drew sustained opposition criticism throughout the following decade.

What Happened?

On 15 March 2026, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh delivered a unanimous verdict reinstating the non-party caretaker government system. The 74-page judgment, written by former Chief Justice Dr Syed Refaat Ahmed, ruled that the caretaker provisions originally introduced by the Thirteenth Amendment are automatically restored in the Constitution without requiring new legislation. The ruling came following appeals and review petitions filed by BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, civil society organization SHUJAN, the Human Rights Support Society, and freedom fighter Mofazzal Islam, challenging the 2011 verdict that had scrapped the system. The court held that the caretaker model was enacted in good faith under Article 7 and justified by the doctrine of necessity as a democratic safeguard. The verdict specifies that the restored provisions will remain dormant until the dissolution of the current parliament, and that the system will take effect from the 14th National Parliamentary Election, with the most recently retired Chief Justice serving as head of the caretaker government during election periods.

A second ruling followed on 9 July 2026, when the Appellate Division dismissed appeals against the earlier High Court judgment on the Fifteenth Amendment. This left in place the High Court's decision to restore both the caretaker government system and the referendum provision. Together, the March and July rulings restored the constitutional basis of the caretaker system through the courts.

Why Partially Adopted?

Provision 16 is classified as Partially Adopted because the Supreme Court rulings restored the main principle of a neutral election-time government. The classification remains partial, however, because restoration occurred through judicial decisions rather than through the parliamentary amendment process required by the Charter.

The detailed arrangements in sub-provisions 16(1) to 16(15), including the selection committee, ranked-choice process, and timetable for appointing the Chief Adviser, have not been enacted. They therefore remain unavailable in practice.

The framework restored by the courts also differs from the Charter's design. Under the Thirteenth Amendment model, the most recently retired Chief Justice would normally become Chief Adviser. The Charter instead proposes a multi-stage process involving representatives of the government and opposition, with judicial members serving as a fallback. SHUJAN welcomed the March ruling

but called for the restored system to be aligned with the Charter. By the end of July 2026, Parliament had not begun work on the Charter's appointment framework. The remaining issue is therefore the final design of the system, not whether a caretaker government will return.

b) Redefinition of Constituency Boundaries Every Census or Ten Years

The July National Charter 2025 mandates a constitutional amendment to Article 119(1)(c) to establish a temporary specialized committee for the determination of parliamentary constituency boundaries, to be convened after every population census or at intervals not exceeding ten years. The composition and functions of this committee are to be prescribed under Section 8(3) of the Parliamentary Constituency Delimitation Act, 2021, as last amended in 2025. The Charter envisions this as a constitutional entrenchment, embedding the delimitation mechanism directly in the Constitution to ensure its permanence and insulate it from political interference.

Charter Provision 27	Redefinition of Constituency Boundaries Every Census or Ten Years
Indicator	Partially Adopted
Agreed Parties	29 political parties and alliances agreed: (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (27), (28), (30), (31), and (32).
Disagreed Parties	N/A
Dissent Notes	1 political party submitted a note of dissent: (33).
Timeline	Short-term

Table 2: Provision 27 Status and Description

What Happened?

The issue entered parliamentary discussion in late March 2026. On 30 March 2026, however, the ruling party indicated that the delimitation-related ordinance might not be brought forward for approval because a new delimitation exercise would not be required until the next census or the completion of the ten-year cycle. Opposition disagreement on how the reform should proceed remained unresolved at this stage. Despite this initial uncertainty, the Delimitation of

Parliamentary Constituency Bill, 2026 was passed by Parliament on 7 April 2026 through a voice vote, following consensus in the all-party parliamentary special committee to accept the ordinance.

Why Partially Adopted?

Provision 27 is classified as Partially Adopted because Parliament passed the Delimitation of Parliamentary Constituency Bill, 2026. The law addresses the central objective of creating a framework for constituency boundary delimitation, and it was approved following agreement in an all-party parliamentary committee.

The Charter, however, requires an amendment to Article 119(1)(c), not ordinary legislation. A parliamentary law can be changed by a simple majority, while constitutional entrenchment would provide stronger protection. The government's earlier suggestion that no further delimitation measure would be needed until the next census or ten-year cycle also leaves uncertainty about whether the required constitutional amendment will be pursued during this Parliament.

c) Constitutional Reform Procedure

The July National Charter 2025 requires that any amendment to the Constitution receive the support of two-thirds of members of the lower house and a majority in the upper house of Parliament. It further specifies that amendments to certain foundational articles, including Articles 8, 48, 56, and 142, as well as the provisions related to the reinstated caretaker government, must be subject to a national referendum. The Charter thus envisions constitutional amendment as a structured, bicameral, and in some cases referendum-backed process, requiring a dedicated parliamentary mechanism to review and advance reform proposals in accordance with these requirements.

Two parties recorded dissent on this provision. BNP opposed giving the proposed upper house a role in constitutional amendments, while BASAD opposed establishing an upper house under current socio-economic conditions. These positions matter because Parliament remains unicameral and the upper house required by the Charter does not yet exist. The Charter's bicameral amendment procedure therefore cannot operate at present. BNP's position is consistent with its recorded dissent and may fall within the Charter's mandate clause if reflected in its election manifesto.

Charter Provision 3	Constitutional Amendment Procedure
Indicator	Ongoing

Agreed Parties	30 political parties and alliances agreed: (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21) [agreed specifically with the two thirds majority in lower house requirement], (22), (23), (24), (25), (27), (28) [agreed with the two-thirds majority requirement], (30), (31), (32), and (33 [expressed differing opinions regarding the powers and scope of the upper house]
Disagreed Parties	N/A
Dissent Notes	2 political parties submitted notes of dissent: (21) [opposed any constitutional role for the upper house in amendments]; (28) [opposed the establishment of an upper house under current socio-economic conditions]
Timeline	Long-term

Table 3: Provision 3 Status and Description

What Happened?

The provision entered formal political discussion on 29 March 2026, when Jamaat-e-Islami raised the issue in Parliament and submitted a notice regarding the oath of the Constitutional Reform Council under the July Charter. No constitutional amendment procedure had been adopted at this stage.

On 1 April 2026, Chief Whip Nurul Islam Moni said that a special parliamentary committee would oversee constitutional amendments. The proposed committee was expected to include 15 to 20 members, with proportional representation from political parties and independent MPs and with legal experts from both the treasury and opposition benches.

By 29 April 2026, the government formally proposed a 17-member special parliamentary committee to advance constitutional amendments in line with the July Charter. The proposed composition included 12 members from the ruling side and allied or independent MPs, with five seats reserved for the opposition. Law Minister Md. Asaduzzaman described the committee as an inclusive parliamentary route for constitutional reform and urged the opposition to submit nominees quickly. Opposition Leader Shafiqur Rahman, however, asked for more time, citing what he described as a conceptual difference between constitutional amendment and broader constitutional reform.

This disagreement deepened through May. On 14 May 2026, Jamaat-e-Islami and the National Citizen Party formally decided not to join the proposed committee. Both parties argued that a 17-member committee dominated by the ruling coalition would not adequately reflect the 70 per cent

referendum mandate for reform, and insisted that the Charter's implementation required a Constitution Reform Council, a mechanism the BNP-led government has rejected. Jamaat and NCP announced plans for rallies across divisional cities through May and July, signalling that their opposition would be pursued both inside and outside Parliament.

On 18 May 2026, Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed confirmed the committee proposal would be reintroduced when Parliament's second session opened on 7 June, while Chief Whip Nurul Islam Moni maintained there was no constitutional alternative to a parliamentary committee. The government's stated aim was to form the body during the budget session and complete the amendment process by early 2027.

By mid-June 2026, the opposition position had hardened further. Opposition Leader and Jamaat Ameer Shafiqur Rahman declared that the opposition would not nominate members to the government-proposed committee, arguing that the referendum mandate was for constitutional reform, not ordinary amendment, and warning that if Parliament failed to honour the referendum verdict, the demand would be pursued through street action. Chief Whip Nurul Islam Moni sought to reframe the debate, arguing that whether the process was called reform or amendment, the work was essentially the same: that constitutions are changed through amendments across the world, and that amendment and reform could advance simultaneously rather than as competing tracks.

The impasse carried into July 2026. On 1 July, Opposition Leader Shafiqur Rahman reiterated that the people had given a mandate for constitutional reform, not mere amendments, and attributed the current political crisis directly to the government's failure to respect the referendum verdict. On 2 July 2026, speaking in Parliament, Rahman formally accused the government of failing to honour the constitutional reform mandate endorsed by referendum, noting that 68.6 per cent of voters had backed reform under the National Consensus Commission's process agreed upon by 31 political parties. He argued that ruling MPs had refused to take the oath as members of the Reform Council, undermining the consensus, and rejected the government's Constitutional Amendment Commission as fundamentally different from the reform mandate arising from a direct public vote. Citing precedents including the caretaker government and previous national referendums, he warned that ignoring the people's verdict risked deepening the political crisis, and vowed the opposition would continue its movement both inside and outside Parliament. Chief Whip Nurul Islam Moni responded the same day, maintaining that there was no substantive difference between the government's amendment process and the opposition's demand for reform, and that the prime minister's position remained one of cross-party collaboration. On 8 July 2026, the Jamaat-led 11-party alliance escalated its pressure, with Secretary General Mia Golam Porwar submitting a six-point memorandum to the Speaker demanding the immediate formation of a Constitution Reform Council and a mandatory roadmap for implementing the referendum verdict. The Speaker assured that the matter would be discussed with the Prime Minister. Alliance leaders warned of "another July uprising" if reforms were not enacted and demanded justice for those killed during the July 2024 uprising. The memorandum was submitted as part of the alliance's ongoing 36-day programme marking the uprising's anniversary.

Why Ongoing?

Provision 3 is classified as Ongoing because the government proposed a parliamentary mechanism, outlined its composition, and publicly committed to completing the amendment process by early 2027. No committee had been formally constituted by the end of July, however, and no amendment procedure had been adopted. The opposition's refusal to participate reflects a disagreement over the mechanism itself, not a minor procedural delay. The government favours a parliamentary amendment committee, while the opposition continues to demand a Constitution Reform Council. Because Provision 3 is the procedural entry point for many other constitutional reforms, the unresolved dispute is delaying progress across the wider agenda.

d) Structure of the Upper House

The July National Charter 2025 sets out the structural framework for the proposed upper house of Parliament across three sub-provisions. Sub-provision 18(a) stipulates that 100 members of the upper house shall be elected through a system of proportional representation based on the number of votes obtained in the lower house election. Sub-provision 18(b) sets the tenure of the upper house at five years from the date of oath-taking, with automatic dissolution upon the dissolution of the lower house. Sub-provision 18(c) requires political parties to publish their candidate lists for the upper house concurrently with the final candidate list for the lower house general election, with at least ten per cent of those candidates being women.

Charter Provision 18(a)	A total of 100 (one hundred) members of the Upper House shall be elected through a system of proportional representation (PR) based on the number of votes obtained in the election to the Lower House.
Indicator	Ongoing
Agreed Parties	24 political parties and alliances agreed: (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (18), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (25), (27), (30), (31), and (32).
Disagreed Parties	N/A
Dissent Notes	7 political parties and alliances submitted notes of dissent: (1), (16), (17), (21) [expressed differing views on the formation process of the Upper House, proposing that it be constituted based on proportional representation of Lower House seats], (24), (28) [stated that an Upper House is unnecessary in the current socio-economic context], and (33)

Charter Provision 18(a)	A total of 100 (one hundred) members of the Upper House shall be elected through a system of proportional representation (PR) based on the number of votes obtained in the election to the Lower House.
Timeline	Long-term

Table 4: Provision 18(a) Status and Description

The dissent record is important. Seven parties, including BNP, opposed the vote-based proportional representation formula in sub-provision 18(a). BNP proposed a seat-based formula, while BASAD questioned the need for an upper house altogether. Seven parties also dissented from sub-provision 18(c) on candidate lists and women's representation. BNP's election manifesto reflected its seat-based approach. The disagreement seen during the monitoring period therefore follows positions recorded during the Charter negotiations rather than a new post-election reversal.

Charter Provision 18 (c)	Political parties must publish their list of candidates for the Upper House concurrently with the final list of candidates for the Lower House general election. The list must include at least 10 per cent female candidates.
Indicator	Ongoing
Agreed Parties	23 political parties and alliances agreed: (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (17), (18), (20), (22), (23), (25), (27), (30), (31), and (32).
Disagreed Parties	N/A
Dissent Notes	7 political parties and alliances submitted notes of dissent: (1), (16), (19), (21), (24) [these parties disagreed with this proposal], (28) [stated that an Upper House is unnecessary in the current socio-economic context], and (33).
Timeline	Long-term

Table 5: Provision 18(c) Status and Description

What Happened?

On 18 February 2026, BNP formally rejected the Charter's proportional vote-based formula for upper house membership, consistent with its note of dissent on 18(a), reiterating its position that

the upper house should be formed based on the proportion of seats won in the lower house, as outlined in its election manifesto. Deputy Speaker Kaiser Kamal clarified BNP's stance, affirming that the idea of an upper house originated with BNP and that the party remains committed to its establishment, but that questions of the formation process, seat-based representation, and structural design would ultimately be determined by the elected parliament. He described claims that BNP opposed the upper house as propaganda, while making clear that the party's vision of its composition differs from the Charter's specification on both 18(a) and 18(c). Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed echoed this position, stating that the government intends to implement the July National Charter and that discussions about forming the upper house remain ongoing, describing the government's engagement as a goodwill gesture.

Political and civil society voices during this period reflected the breadth of the debate around 18(a). Mufti Syed Muhammad Rezaul Karim, Ameer of Islami Andolan Bangladesh, argued that the creation of an upper house based on proportional votes as the Charter specifies is now both a legal obligation and a moral responsibility, framing the issue as one of constitutional fairness and democratic representation. Civil society group Jubo Bangali took a different angle, insisting that the upper house must include non-party representatives from labour, workers, and professional groups to prevent elite domination and uphold the democratic mandate of the referendum, a proposal that goes beyond both the Charter's specification and BNP's manifesto position.

Why Ongoing?

Sub-provisions 18(a) and 18(c) are classified as Ongoing because the structure of the upper house is under active political discussion and the government has restated its commitment to establishing the chamber.

No constitutional amendment has been introduced, and the main disagreement remains unresolved: the Charter proposes representation based on votes, while BNP favours a formula based on lower-house seats. Establishment of the upper house also depends on Provision 17, which creates a bicameral Parliament, and Provision 3, which sets the amendment procedure. By the end of July 2026, both sub-provisions remained under discussion but were blocked by these unresolved issues.

e) Method for Increasing Women's Representation in the National Parliament

Provision 22 sets out a gradual approach to increasing women's representation in Parliament. Sub-provision 22(a) retains the existing 50 reserved seats while requiring an amendment to Article 65(3). Sub-provision 22(c) requires political parties to nominate at least ten per cent women candidates in the general election following the next election, and sub-provision 22(d) requires the share to rise by at least five percentage points in each subsequent election until it reaches 33 per cent.

Charter Provision 22(a)	Necessary amendments shall be made to Article 65(3) of the Constitution while retaining the existing 50 (fifty) reserved seats.
Indicator	Ongoing
Agreed Parties	26 political parties and alliances agreed: (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), (21), (22), (23), (24), (30), (31), (32), and (33).
Disagreed Parties	N/A
Dissent Notes	4 political parties submitted notes of dissent: (20) [in favour of direct election to 100 seats for women], (25), (27) [in favour of reserving 100 seats for women with direct election], and (28) [in favour of direct election to 100 seats].
Timeline	Long-term

Table 6: Provision 22(a) Status and Description

The dissent was limited but relevant. Four parties favoured direct elections to 100 women's seats instead of retaining the existing reserved-seat system under sub-provision 22(a). Four parties also dissented from sub-provisions 22(c) and 22(d). BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami agreed to all three provisions, so neither party has a recorded Charter objection that would explain inaction on them.

Charter Provision 22(c)	In the next general election following the signing of the July National Charter 2025, each political party shall nominate at least 5 (five) per cent women candidates for the existing 300 (three hundred) parliamentary seats. However, this provision shall not be included in the Constitution.
Indicator	Ongoing
Agreed Parties	27 political parties and alliances agreed: (1), (2), (3), (5), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (20), (21), (22), (24), (25), (27), (28), (30), (31), (32), and (33).

Disagreed Parties	N/A
Dissent Notes	3 political parties submitted notes of dissent: (4), (19), and (23).
Timeline	Long-term

Table 7: Provision 22(c) Status and Description

What Happened?

No legislative, executive, or constitutional action was recorded on sub-provisions 22(a), 22(c), or 22(d). Their Ongoing classification is based on research and advocacy by civil society organisations, which kept the issue in public discussion but did not begin a formal implementation process.

On 8 June 2026, Wave Foundation and ActionAid Bangladesh published a study titled 'Political Parties' Position on the Representation of the People Order (RPO).' Although 87.3 per cent of respondents knew about the 33 per cent representation target for 2030, 72 per cent believed that the provision was not being implemented effectively. Only 1.4 per cent expressed confidence in the Election Commission's ability to enforce it. The study identified patriarchal party structures, weak political commitment, family and social pressure, limited internal democracy, and weak oversight as major barriers. It also noted that younger women face online violence, insecurity, financial constraints, and male-dominated political environments.

Charter Provision 22(d)	Under this procedure, political parties shall continue to increase the nomination of women candidates by a minimum of 5 (five) per cent in each successive general election until the target of nominating at least 33 (thirty-three) per cent women candidates in general elections is achieved.
Indicator	Ongoing
Agreed Parties	26 political parties and alliances agreed: (1), (2), (3), (5), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (15), (16), (17), (18), (20), (21), (22), (24), (25), (27), (28), (30), (31), (32), and (33).
Disagreed Parties	N/A

Dissent Notes	4 political parties submitted notes of dissent: (4), (14), (19), and (23).
Timeline	Long-term

Table 8: Provision 22(d) Status and Description

On 28 June 2026, Wave Foundation and ActionAid Bangladesh held a symposium on women's political participation and leadership. Participants, including MPs, Election Commission officials, civil society representatives, and international partners, called for stronger political commitment, internal party reform, and changes to the Representation of the People Order. A Charter of Demands proposed 50 per cent representation for women at all levels of government, regular gender audits of political parties, transparent nominations, internal complaint mechanisms, and direct election through rotating reserved seats in local government. These proposals went beyond the Charter in some areas but reinforced the case for stronger accountability on women's representation.

Why Ongoing?

The three sub-provisions are classified as Ongoing because the June study and symposium brought the Charter's commitments into active public discussion and produced specific proposals for monitoring party performance.

No formal implementation step followed. There was no documented government action on Article 65(3), and the nomination targets in sub-provisions 22(c) and 22(d) remained unlegislated. The available evidence therefore shows civil society activity, but not an official implementation pathway.

2. Election Commission

a) Delimitation of Electoral Constituencies

Provision 49 required an immediate, pre-election delimitation process led by a specialised committee working with the Election Commission. Unlike Provision 27, which concerns a long-term constitutional mechanism, Provision 49 applied specifically to the 13th National Parliamentary Election. Twenty-nine parties agreed, and only LDP recorded dissent.

Charter Provision 49	As an immediate measure regarding the delimitation of electoral constituencies, a specialized committee comprising appropriately qualified and competent individuals shall be formed with the assistance of the Election Commission (or, if such a committee has already been formed, necessary modifications shall be
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	made). The parliamentary constituencies shall then be demarcated based on the recommendations of this committee.
Indicator	Partially Adopted
Agreed Parties	29 political parties and alliances agreed: (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (27), (28), (30), (31), and (32).
Disagreed Parties	N/A
Dissent Notes	1 political party submitted a note of dissent: 1 (33).
Timeline	Short-term

Table 9: Provision 49 Status and Description

What Happened?

Before the election, the Election Commission used a committee-assisted process to revise constituency boundaries. This met the main procedural requirements of the provision.

Some of the decisions were later challenged in court. On 20 January 2026, the High Court questioned or overturned several delimitation decisions and stayed the election in at least one constituency, Comilla-2.

Why Partially Adopted?

Provision 49 is classified as Partially Adopted because the committee was formed and constituency boundaries were revised before the election.

The process was not fully adopted because some decisions did not withstand judicial review. The Charter sought both a functioning procedure and legally sound boundaries. Court intervention showed that the procedure was completed, but some of its outcomes remained contested.

3. Legislature

a) Establishing a Bicameral Legislature

Provision 17 requires a constitutional amendment creating a bicameral Parliament consisting of the Jatiya Sangsad as the lower house and a Senate as the upper house. This would replace

Bangladesh's longstanding unicameral system and provide the institutional basis for several related provisions, including the structure of the upper house under Provision 18.

Five parties recorded dissent, four of them arguing that an upper house was unnecessary in the current socio-economic context. BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami both agreed to the principle of bicameralism. The main dispute during the monitoring period was therefore about the upper house's composition rather than whether it should exist.

Charter Provision 17	The Constitution shall be amended to provide that Bangladesh will have a bicameral legislature, consisting of a Lower House (Jatiya Sangsad/National Parliament) and an Upper House (Senate).
Indicator	Ongoing
Agreed Parties	25 political parties and alliances agreed: (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (9), (10), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (27), (30), (31), and (32).
Disagreed Parties	N/A
Dissent Notes	5 political parties submitted notes of dissent: (2), (11), (25), (28) [stating that an upper house is not necessary in the current socio-economic context], and (33)
Timeline	Long-term

Table 10: Provision 17 Status and Description

What Happened?

No bill or constitutional amendment to establish a bicameral Parliament was introduced during the reporting period. The government continued to support the idea of an upper house, while debate focused mainly on how its members would be selected. Those discussions are examined under Provision 18.

Why Ongoing?

Provision 17 is classified as Ongoing because the government has publicly affirmed the principle of bicameralism and political parties are discussing the design of the upper house. Formal implementation has not begun. Progress also depends on resolving Provision 3, since the upper house cannot be created without a constitutional amendment.

4. Judiciary

a) Independence of the Judiciary

Provision 33 calls for a constitutional guarantee of complete judicial independence. Thirty-one of the 33 signatory parties agreed. BNP and LDP noted that Articles 94(4) and 116A already address the issue and considered a further clause unnecessary, but neither party rejected the principle.

Charter Provision 33	The Constitution shall include a provision ensuring the complete independence of the judiciary.
Indicator	Ongoing
Agreed Parties	31 political parties and alliances agreed: (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21) [stated that since the matter is already provided for in Articles 94(4) and 116A of the Constitution, reiteration of this clause is unnecessary], (22), (23), (24), (26), (27), (28), (29), (30), (31), (32), and (33 [stated that since the matter is already provided for in Articles 94(4) and 116A of the Constitution, reiteration of this clause is unnecessary].
Disagreed Parties	N/A
Dissent Notes	N/A
Timeline	Long-term

Table 11: Provision 33 Status and Description

What Happened?

No constitutional amendment was introduced under Provision 33. The issue nevertheless remained active through court proceedings, professional advocacy, and civil society debate on judicial administration and finance.

In June 2026, at a seminar titled "Lawyers' Budget Thinking" held at the Jatiya Press Club, the Bangladesh Lawyers' Council demanded the restructuring of the Supreme Court Secretariat and the introduction of a separate judicial budget, directly linking financial and administrative autonomy to the constitutional guarantee of judicial independence. Keynote speaker Advocate Matiur Rahman Akand argued that judicial independence requires not only formal constitutional guarantees but also financial and administrative autonomy and that as long as the judiciary remains dependent on the executive for recruitment, infrastructure, promotion, and financial allocation, the constitutional principle of Provision 33 cannot be meaningfully realised. Justice Shahidul Islam

reinforced this position, stating that the current budgetary allocation was insufficient to reduce case backlogs or run judicial activities effectively, and that a separate judicial budget was a necessary precondition for genuine institutional independence.

Why Ongoing?

Provision 33 is classified as Ongoing because judicial independence remained under active legal and professional discussion throughout the reporting period.

There was no formal constitutional action. Developments under Provisions 31 and 52, concerning judicial appointments and the Supreme Court Secretariat, also affected the practical prospects for independence. Those provisions show a gap between support for the principle and the institutional arrangements maintained during the reporting period.

5. Anti-Corruption Commission

a) Prohibition of Practices that Legitimize Illegitimate Income

Provision 70 requires a law permanently prohibiting state measures that legitimise income from an unlawful source, in line with Article 20(2) of the Constitution. Thirty-one parties agreed, while LDP opposed the provision. BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami recorded no dissent. The provision is directed mainly at recurring budget measures that grant amnesty for undisclosed or so-called black money.

Charter Provision 70	In accordance with Article 20(2) of the existing Constitution, a specific law shall be enacted to permanently prohibit any state practice that legitimizes income without lawful source.
Indicator	Ongoing
Agreed Parties	31 political parties and alliances agreed: (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (26), (27), (28), (29), (30), (31), and (32).
Disagreed Parties	1 political party disagreed: (33).
Dissent Notes	N/A

Timeline	Long-term
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Table 12: Provision 70 Status and Description

What Happened?

No law permanently prohibiting such practices was introduced. The provision remained active mainly because civil society organisations challenged reports that the government might restore a black money amnesty in the FY2026-27 budget.

On 5 June 2026, Transparency International Bangladesh warned against an unconditional black money amnesty. TIB argued that the measure would reward unlawful income, weaken the position of honest taxpayers, and reverse the interim government's earlier decision to abolish such facilities. It also cited the Charter and Recommendation 3 of the ACC Reform Commission, both of which supported permanent abolition. TIB said that any arrangement for repatriated assets should exclude illegally acquired funds and should not shield individuals facing active cases.

Why Ongoing?

Provision 70 is classified as Ongoing because TIB's intervention connected the reported budget proposal directly to the Charter's anti-corruption commitment and kept the issue in public debate. No legislation was introduced, however, and the reported policy direction raised the possibility of reversal rather than progress. The final contents of the FY2026-27 budget fall outside this reporting period and will be assessed in later updates.

What the Active Provisions Show

BNP agreed without reservation to 8 of the 12 active provisions. Its recorded dissent on Provisions 3, 16, 18(a), and 18(c) concerned the constitutional amendment process and the design of the upper house. In particular, BNP favoured a seat-based rather than vote-based formula for the upper house and opposed giving that chamber a role in constitutional amendments. These positions were recorded during the Charter negotiations, so they should not be treated as post-election reversals. Where the mandate clause applies, they provide a limited Charter-based explanation for the government's approach.

BNP agreed to the remaining eight provisions, which cover women's representation, judicial independence, bicameralism, and the prohibition of practices that legitimise unlawful income. The mandate clause does not explain the absence of government action on those commitments. Five of the eight remained active mainly because of civil society research or advocacy rather than a formal government initiative.

BNP's Charter Position across 12 Active Provisions




Figure 4:BNP's Charter Position across 12 Active Provisions*

Civil society was the main source of activity for five of the nine Ongoing provisions: women's representation under Provisions 22(a), 22(c), and 22(d); judicial independence under Provision 33; and the prohibition of practices legitimising unlawful income under Provision 70. Government action accounted for four Ongoing provisions: the constitutional amendment procedure, the establishment of a bicameral legislature, and the two upper-house sub-provisions. Of the three Partially Adopted provisions shown in the aggregated chart, two were advanced by government action and one by court rulings on the caretaker government system.

This distinction is important. Research, public meetings, professional advocacy, and civil society warnings can keep a provision on the agenda, but they do not replace legislation or executive action. In the areas of women's representation, anti-corruption, and judicial independence, civil society activity filled a gap left by limited or adverse government action. Unless that engagement leads to a formal commitment, these provisions remain vulnerable to delay or reversal.

**For Provision 16, BNP's dissent varies across sub-provision groups. The chart represents Provision 16 as a single dissented entry based on BNP's recorded note of dissent on the caretaker government formation process*




Figure 5: Primary Driver of Reform Activity

Reversals and Non-Implementation (Binned)

This section examines provisions whose main purpose was not achieved or was reversed during the reporting period. A provision is classified as Binned when implementation returns the relevant institution to the pre-reform position, allows a time-bound commitment to lapse, or applies the reform in a way that defeats its stated objective.

1. Constitution

a) Women's Leadership Sideline

Sub-provision 22(b) required every political party to nominate women for at least five per cent of the 300 general parliamentary seats in the first election held after the Charter was signed. The requirement was time-bound and applied directly to candidate selection before the 13th National Parliamentary Election.

BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, and 24 other parties agreed to the provision. Only Islami Andolan Bangladesh, Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis, and Bangladesh Nezame Islam Party recorded dissent. The major parties therefore had no Charter-based objection to the five per cent requirement.

Charter Provision 22(b)	In the next general election following the signing of the July National Charter 2025, each political party shall nominate at least 5 (five) percent women candidates for the existing 300 (three hundred) parliamentary seats. However, this provision shall not be included in the Constitution.
Indicator	Binned
Agreed Parties	27 political parties and alliances agreed: (1), (2), (3), (5), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (20), (21), (22), (24), (25), (27), (28), (30), (31), (32), and (33).
Disagreed Parties	N/A
Dissent Notes	3 political parties submitted notes of dissent: (4), (19), and (23).
Timeline	Short-term

Table 13: Provision 22(b) Status and Description

What Happened?

Only 78 of the 1,981 candidates in the 13th National Parliamentary Election were women, equivalent to about 3.93 per cent. The aggregate figure fell below the five per cent minimum set by the Charter. Jasmine Tuli, a former additional secretary of the Election Commission and member of the Election Reform Commission, linked the shortfall to longstanding patterns within political parties. She noted that women who build political careers through student and field-level activism remain rare, while family connections continue to shape many nominations.

Jamaat-e-Islami nominated no women candidates. In an Al Jazeera interview, party Ameer Shafiqur Rahman said that women could not lead the party because of its religious position. The statement was inconsistent with Jamaat's earlier agreement to the five per cent nomination requirement.

BNP separately proposed a 'one candidate per family' policy for the reserved women's seats in the 13th Parliament. That proposal concerned the reserved-seat system and did not address the direct nomination requirement under sub-provision 22(b).

Why Binned?

Sub-provision 22(b) is classified as Binned because the election was held with women making up only 3.93 per cent of candidates. The requirement applied to that specific election and can no longer be fulfilled retrospectively.

The failure was system-wide rather than marginal. The aggregate result fell below the threshold, known barriers within party nomination processes were not addressed, and Jamaat publicly adopted a position that was difficult to reconcile with its Charter commitment. These factors support the Binned classification.

b) Nomination of Deputy Speaker

Provision 23 requires one Deputy Speaker in each chamber of Parliament to be selected from outside the ruling party. Thirty-one of 33 parties agreed, including BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami. Only the Revolutionary Communist League opposed the provision.

Charter Provision 23	Nomination of Deputy Speaker from the Opposition: The Constitution shall include a provision stipulating that, in both Houses of the Legislature, one Deputy Speaker shall be nominated from among members other than those belonging to the ruling party.
Indicator	Binned
Agreed Parties	31 political parties and alliances agreed: (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (27), (28), (29), (30), (31), (32), and (33).
Disagreed Parties	1 political party disagreed: (26).
Dissent Notes	N/A
Timeline	Short-term

Table 14: Provision 23 Status and Description

What Happened?

On 2 March 2026, Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed publicly confirmed that the government remained committed to implementing the July National Charter's requirement on the Deputy Speaker position, and that the ruling BNP had formally asked Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, as the main opposition party, to nominate a candidate for the post. He stated that the Deputy Speaker could be elected on the same day as the Speaker, and that the offer had been extended both verbally and in meetings.

On 3 March 2026, it was reported that three Jamaat leaders' names had come up in discussion for the Deputy Speaker position, indicating that the offer was being actively considered within the party. However, on 11 March 2026, Jamaat-e-Islami formally declined the offer. The party's Secretary General Mia Golam Porwar stated that the party did not seek the Deputy Speaker position unless a final decision had been made on the implementation of the July Charter as a whole. He described the post as a symbolic gesture and emphasised that constitutional reforms and a referendum, as outlined in the Charter, must be addressed before Jamaat would accept any parliamentary role offered under it. The party indicated it would revisit the matter only after parliamentary discussions on the Charter had concluded. On 12 March 2026, BNP Standing Committee member Kayser Kamal, a ruling party MP from Netrakona-1 and BNP's law affairs secretary, was elected Deputy Speaker of the 13th Parliament.

Why Binned?

Provision 23 is classified as Binned because the Deputy Speaker ultimately elected to the 13th Parliament was a BNP member. The government had invited Jamaat-e-Islami to nominate an opposition candidate, but Jamaat declined while wider disputes over Charter implementation remained unresolved.

The result, rather than the government's initial offer, determines the status. The Charter sought to place the office outside the ruling party, and that outcome was not achieved.

Jamaat's refusal did not amount to a rejection of opposition representation in principle. It was part of the party's wider decision not to participate in Charter-related arrangements until the dispute over the implementation mechanism was resolved. The episode therefore anticipated the later opposition boycott of the constitutional amendment committee.

2. Judiciary

a) Appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court (Judicial Appointment Commission)

Provision 31 requires an independent Judicial Appointment Commission led by the Chief Justice to oversee appointments to the Supreme Court. Twenty-nine parties agreed. BNP alone objected to placing the mechanism in the Constitution and preferred a separate law. Its dissent concerned the legal form of the mechanism, not the principle of a structured appointment process.

Charter Provision 31	The Constitution shall include a provision stipulating that a Judicial Appointment Commission (JAC), led by the Chief Justice, shall be established as an independent body to oversee the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court.
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Indicator	Binned
Agreed Parties	29 political parties and alliances agreed: (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), (22), (23), (24), (26), (27), (28), (30), (31), (32), and (33).
Disagreed Parties	1 political party disagreed: (21) [stated that a separate law shall be enacted regarding the appointment of Supreme Court judges].
Dissent Notes	N/A
Timeline	Long-term

Table 15: Provision 31 Status and Description

What Happened?

The Supreme Court Judges Appointment Ordinance 2025 created a structured appointments framework during the interim-government period. It was the main legal measure taken toward implementing Provision 31.

Parliament repealed the ordinance in April 2026 following recommendations from the committee reviewing interim-government measures. Transparency International Bangladesh, legal experts, and former judges criticised the decision, warning that it could restore greater executive influence over judicial appointments.

Why Binned?

Provision 31 is classified as Binned because the appointments framework created by the ordinance was repealed and no independent replacement mechanism was introduced. The process therefore returned to the earlier arrangement.

BNP's dissent does not fully explain this outcome. The party favoured legislation instead of constitutional entrenchment, but no replacement law was introduced and no legislative timetable was announced. The issue was therefore not simply the choice between a constitutional and statutory mechanism; the independent framework itself was removed.

b) Establishment of the Supreme Court Secretariat

Provision 52 requires legislation establishing an independent Supreme Court Secretariat. The Secretariat would manage the administration of subordinate courts, judicial budgets, and the

promotion, transfer, and discipline of subordinate-court judges. It would also receive funding through a dedicated mechanism intended to protect judicial financial autonomy.

All 32 parties that expressed a view supported Provision 52, including BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami. No dissent or reservation was recorded.

Charter Provision 52	To ensure the effective separation of the judiciary from the executive branch, the Supreme Court shall have its own independent Secretariat, for which necessary legislation shall be enacted. To guarantee the financial independence of the judiciary, funding shall be provided from a dedicated fund attached to this Secretariat. The Secretariat shall be responsible for the administrative activities of subordinate courts, preparation of budgets, and the promotion, transfer, and disciplinary measures concerning judges of subordinate courts.
Indicator	Binned
Agreed Parties	32 political parties and alliances agreed: (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (26), (27), (28), (29), (30), (31), (32), and (33).
Disagreed Parties	N/A
Dissent Notes	N/A
Timeline	Long-term

Table 16: Provision 52 Status and Description

What Happened?

Implementation began during the interim-government period. A High Court judgment in September 2025 held that control and discipline over subordinate-court judges should rest with the Supreme Court and directed the creation of an independent Secretariat within three months. The interim government issued the Supreme Court Secretariat Ordinance in November 2025, after which the Secretariat was inaugurated.

On 3 April 2026, the special parliamentary committee reviewing interim government ordinances recommended repealing both the Supreme Court Secretariat Ordinance 2025 and the Supreme Court Secretariat Amendment Ordinance 2026. On 8 April 2026, the High Court formally

published its full judgment reaffirming the directive to establish an independent Secretariat within three months, while the government simultaneously announced its intention to appeal, suspending the High Court order pending the Appellate Division's final ruling.

On 10 April 2026, Parliament passed the Supreme Court Secretariat Repeal Act, abolishing the Secretariat, transferring its budget, projects, and programmes back to the Law and Justice Division, and eliminating all posts created under it. On 19 May 2026, the Supreme Court Secretariat was formally shut down and its judges attached to the Law Ministry, returning the judiciary's administrative structure to the pre-reform arrangement. On 21 April 2026, SHUJAN Secretary Badiul Alam Majumdar filed an appeal seeking to maintain the status quo of the Secretariat as it existed before the repeal act, and requesting suspension of the repeal law's implementation pending final resolution. A separate writ challenging the repeal law was heard in the High Court but postponed after the state indicated it would appeal the earlier High Court judgment directly to the Appellate Division. Attorney General Md Ruhul Quddus Kazal confirmed the government's appeal, explaining that the case involved significant constitutional interpretation under Article 103(2)(a) and must be resolved cautiously. The Appellate Division subsequently fixed 1 September 2026 as the date for hearing the government's appeal against the High Court verdict.

Civil society organisations and many lawyers criticised the repeal. TIB warned that it could increase executive influence over the judiciary. Supreme Court lawyer Shishir Monir described the decision as a 'black day' for judicial independence and announced plans for legal action. Government-aligned lawyers argued that Parliament was entitled to repeal an ordinance that had not been enacted as a law, while opposition-aligned lawyers called for the Secretariat to be restored.

Why Binned?

Provision 52 is classified as Binned because Parliament abolished the Secretariat and returned its functions, budget, and posts to the Law and Justice Division. No alternative arrangement consistent with the Charter was introduced.

The classification is especially significant because the provision had unanimous support among parties that expressed a view. The repeal cannot be linked to a recorded Charter dissent or reservation. It is therefore one of the clearest examples in the report of a consensus commitment being reversed.

The legal position remains unsettled because the government's appeal is scheduled for hearing in the Appellate Division on 1 September 2026. During the period covered by this report, however, the repeal act remained in force and judicial administrative functions had returned to executive control.

c) Elections of Bar Associations and Bar Council

Provision 60 seeks to remove party influence from Bar Association and Bar Council elections by denying recognition to lawyers' organisations affiliated with political parties. Twenty-five parties agreed and seven disagreed. BNP and LDP argued that citizens' constitutional right to political participation should not be restricted. The provision also did not define clearly what degree of political association would amount to prohibited affiliation.

Charter Provision 60	To eliminate the influence of partisan politics in the selection of candidates and the conduct of elections for Bar Associations and the Bar Council, no association of lawyers affiliated with or connected to any political party (including associate, front, or allied organizations) shall be granted recognition.
Indicator	Binned
Agreed Parties	25 political parties and alliances agreed: (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), (22), (24), (26), (29), (31), and (32).
Disagreed Parties	7 political parties and alliances disagreed: (21) [stated that the constitutional right of citizens to engage in politics cannot be curtailed], (23), (25), (27), (28), (30), and (33) [also stated that the constitutional right to political participation cannot be curtailed].
Dissent Notes	N/A
Timeline	Short-term

Table 17: Provision 60 Status and Description

What Happened?

The 2026 Supreme Court Bar Association election tested the provision in practice. Although the election was formally described as non-partisan, candidates competed through panels widely identified with BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, and NCP. The provision did not provide a clear test for determining when a panel should be treated as party-affiliated.

Application was also uneven. An Extraordinary General Meeting on 26 April 2026 barred Awami League-leaning lawyers from participating, while panels associated with BNP, Jamaat, and NCP were allowed to contest. The result reduced political plurality without removing partisan alignment from the election.

Why Binned?

Provision 60 is classified as Binned because Bar elections continued to operate through politically aligned panels and the stated objective of depoliticisation was not achieved.

This failure differed from the repeal of the judicial appointment framework or the Supreme Court Secretariat. Provision 60 lacked a workable definition of political affiliation and did not identify an institution responsible for enforcing the restriction. The rule therefore existed in principle but could not be applied consistently.

Its ambiguity also allowed selective exclusion. One political group was barred while others continued to organise through aligned panels. In practice, this reinforced rather than reduced partisan distortion.

BNP's recorded dissent helps explain the absence of government action to enforce the rule, but it does not explain the selective exclusion of Awami League-aligned lawyers. That outcome arose from the way political actors used the provision's ambiguity.

3. Anti-Corruption Commission

a) Appointment to the Anti-Corruption Commission

Provision 42 would make the Anti-Corruption Commission a constitutional body and establish a Selection and Review Committee to oversee appointments and performance. The proposed committee would include senior judges, the Comptroller and Auditor General, the Chairperson of the Public Service Commission, representatives of the government and opposition in Parliament, and a citizen representative nominated by the Chief Justice.

Twenty-three parties agreed and seven recorded dissent. BNP preferred to regulate ACC appointments through legislation rather than through a constitutional provision. That position offers a limited explanation for using a statutory route, but it does not explain a failure to pursue the underlying objective of an independent and structured appointment process.

Charter Provision 42	As the current Anti-Corruption Commission is a statutory institution, a new article shall be added to the Constitution to elevate it to a constitutional body as follows: “(1) There shall be an independent Anti-Corruption Commission in Bangladesh. To oversee the appointment and performance of this Commission, a Selection and Review Committee shall be constituted comprising: (a) the senior-most Judge of the Appellate Division, other than the Chief Justice (who shall be the Chairperson of the Committee), (b) the senior-most Judge of the High Court Division, (c) the Comptroller and Auditor General, (d) the Chairperson of the Public Service Commission (General), (e) one representative nominated by the Leader of the House in the National Parliament, (f) one representative nominated by the Leader of the Opposition in the National Parliament, and (g) one citizen representative nominated by the Chief Justice (experienced in anti-corruption and good governance initiatives). The Committee shall, in accordance with the law enacted by Parliament, invite “expressions of interest” and “curriculum vitae” from interested and qualified individuals, and conduct searches to identify suitable candidates for appointment as the Chairperson and Commissioners of the Anti-Corruption Commission. The Committee shall, as prescribed by law, (a) select and recommend names to the President for the appointment of the Chairperson and Commissioners, and (b) periodically review the activities of the Commission. Among the Chairperson and four (4) Commissioners, at least one (1) shall be a woman. (2) The Committee shall transparently verify and evaluate the credentials of shortlisted candidates and, by the procedure prescribed by law, recommend one (1) person as Chairperson and up to four (4) persons as Commissioners to the President, who shall appoint them for a term of four (4) years from the date of assumption of office. (3) The Chairperson or any other Commissioner of the Anti-Corruption Commission shall not be removed except in the same manner and on the same grounds applicable to a Judge of the Supreme Court. (4) The procedures for selection, qualifications, disqualifications, age limits, terms and conditions of service, duties, review mechanisms, transparency and accountability, resignation, and reappointment shall be determined by a law enacted by Parliament. (5) The Anti-Corruption Commission shall have the authority to make necessary rules for the performance of its duties and functions.””
Indicator	Binned

Agreed Parties	23 political parties agreed: (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (18), (19), (20), (22), (23), (25), (27), (28), (30), (31), and (32).
Disagreed Parties	N/A
Dissent Notes	7 political parties and alliances submitted notes of dissent: (1), (2), (16), (17), (21) [stated that the appointment process shall be determined through legislation], (24), and (33).
Timeline	Short-term

Table 18: Provision 42 Status and Description

What Happened?

During the interim-government period, the Anti-Corruption Commission Amendment Ordinance 2025 expanded the Commission to five members and moved its structure closer to the Charter's proposal, although it did not create the full constitutional mechanism.

On 11 April 2026, the ACC Amendment Ordinance was not placed before Parliament within the required 30-day period and lapsed automatically, losing legal effectiveness. Although the government indicated the ordinance might be reintroduced after further scrutiny, no reintroduction occurred during the monitoring period.

On 18 April 2026, the ACC was reported to have been effectively frozen since 3 March 2026, when the Commission's Chairman and Commissioners resigned, leaving all core functions, including inquiries, case filings, asset freezes, and international cooperation on asset recovery stalled. The government had not yet formed the mandated selection committee under the lapsed ordinance. Experts warned that the leadership vacuum exposed deep structural weaknesses and political influence over the Commission, eroding public trust and creating space for corruption.

On 7 June 2026, the government initiated the appointment process not through the Charter's proposed constitutional mechanism but through the existing Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2004, forming a search committee comprising a judge from the Appellate Division, a judge from the High Court Division, the Comptroller and Auditor General, the immediate past Cabinet Secretary, and the Chairperson of the Public Service Commission. This committee diverges from the Charter's proposed Selection and Review Committee in both composition and constitutional standing; it operates under the existing statutory framework rather than under the new constitutional architecture the Charter required.

On 4 July 2026, four months after the ACC leadership vacuum began, the government formally constituted a five-member search committee under Section 7 of the ACC Act 2004 to recommend new leadership for the Commission. Transparency International Bangladesh and the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre criticised the four-month delay as undermining institutional credibility and the government's broader reform commitments, while welcoming the committee's formation as a necessary first step toward restoring the ACC's operational capacity.

Why Binned?

Provision 42 is classified as Binned because the government returned to the appointment process under the ACC Act 2004 rather than establishing the constitutional and multi-stakeholder framework set out in the Charter.

BNP's recorded preference for legislation provides some basis for using a statutory approach, but no alternative reform law was enacted. Instead, the ordinance lapsed, the Commission remained without leadership for four months, and appointments resumed under the existing framework. This outcome went beyond BNP's stated objection to constitutional entrenchment.

The leadership vacancy also had practical consequences. Inquiries, case filings, asset freezes, and international cooperation on asset recovery were reported to have stalled during the four-month period.

4. Police

a) Establishment of an Independent Police Commission:

Provision 69 requires an Independent Police Commission established by an Act of Parliament. The body would receive complaints from citizens and police personnel and would be intended to support professional, accountable, and politically independent policing. The Charter also specifies its composition, including a retired Appellate Division justice as chair, government and opposition representatives, and at least two women. Thirty parties agreed and none recorded dissent.

Charter Provision 69	To ensure professionalism, accountability, and citizen- friendliness of the police force, an Independent Police Commission shall be established. Objectives of the Commission.
Indicator	Binned

Agreed Parties	30 political parties and alliances agreed: (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (27), (28), (30), (31), (32), and (33).
Disagreed Parties	N/A
Dissent Notes	N/A
Timeline	Long-term

Table 19: Provision 69 Status and Description

What Happened?

During the interim government period, the Police Commission Ordinance 2025 was issued as the primary legal instrument to carry Provision 69 forward. On 7 April 2026, it was reported that the government was revising this ordinance before introducing it as a parliamentary bill, signalling initial legislative intent to establish the Commission. However, the revision process attracted significant criticism. Transparency International Bangladesh argued that the proposed changes diluted the Commission's independence by increasing executive control and introducing bureaucratic oversight mechanisms inconsistent with the Charter's vision of an impartial oversight body. TIB Executive Director Dr. Iftekharuzzaman stated that the proposed structure would fall short of transforming the police into a professional and citizen-friendly force. Experts and former officials warned that weakening the Commission's design would prolong the politicisation of the police and undermine meaningful reform of appointment, promotion, and accountability mechanisms.

On 22 April 2026, Parliament enacted 87 laws converting 113 interim government ordinances into legislation but allowed 13 ordinances to lapse, including the Police Commission Ordinance 2025. The lapsed ordinances also included measures on enforced disappearances, anti-corruption, judicial independence, and human rights. The government indicated that some of these ordinances, including the Police Commission Ordinance, might be reintroduced in the future, but provided no legislative timeline for doing so.

Why Binned?

Provision 69 is classified as Binned because the Police Commission Ordinance 2025 was allowed to lapse without being converted into law and no replacement bill was introduced during the reporting period.

The government's statement that the ordinance might be reintroduced was not accompanied by a timetable or draft legislation. By the end of July 2026, the legal basis for establishing the Commission had therefore been removed without a substitute.

Three points reinforce this assessment. The provision had no recorded dissent; the proposed revisions had already been criticised for weakening the Commission's independence; and the ordinance lapsed alongside several other measures on enforced disappearances, anti-corruption, judicial independence, and human rights. The outcome therefore appears as part of a wider pattern rather than an isolated delay.

What the Binned Provisions Show

Seven provisions, or 36.8 per cent of the 19 actively tracked provisions, are classified as Binned. Provisions 22(b) and 23 failed in connection with the election and the formation of Parliament. Five others, Provisions 31, 42, 52, 60, and 69, were affected between April and June 2026 during or after Parliament's review of interim-government ordinances. The concentration of five cases within one parliamentary process points to a broader pattern of reversal rather than a series of unrelated decisions.

Dissent Records and Implementation Outcomes

The relationship between recorded party positions and implementation is important. Four Binned provisions, 22(b), 23, 52, and 69, had no recorded dissent or disagreement from any signatory party, including BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami. The mandate clause therefore provides no Charter-based justification for departing from those commitments.

BNP disagreed with Provisions 31 and 60 and recorded dissent on Provision 42. In each case, however, its stated position pointed to an alternative mechanism rather than the removal of an existing framework or the absence of a replacement. Jamaat-e-Islami agreed to all seven Binned provisions.

The following analysis covers all 19 actively tracked provisions: the 12 Ongoing and Partially Adopted provisions discussed in Part I and the 7 Binned provisions discussed in Part II.




Figure 6: Dissent record vs implementation outcome across 19 tracked provisions

BNP's Charter Position on Binned Provisions

BNP agreed without reservation to four of the seven Binned provisions, dissented on Provision 42, and disagreed with Provisions 31 and 60. The mandate clause may therefore be relevant to three provisions, and only where the party's election manifesto clearly reflected those positions. It does not apply to the remaining four.




Figure 7: BNP's recorded Charter position for each of the 7 Binned provisions

Pending Provisions and Areas Without Documented Activity

Eighty-one of the 114 trackable provisions remained Pending at the midpoint of the monitoring year. For 34, no structural or procedural barrier was identified, but no government initiative was recorded. Another 21 were blocked by the unresolved constitutional amendment procedure under Provision 3. Four concerned appointment powers that had not been redistributed, four depended on local government elections that had not yet been held, and two depended directly on the creation of the upper house. These categories explain 65 provisions; the remaining 16 involve overlapping or compound causes.




Figure 8: Pending Blockage Reason

***Note:** Categories reflect analytical classifications and are approximate. The total of 65 represents provisions where a primary blockage type could be clearly identified. The remaining 16 provisions involve overlapping or compound reasons for inaction.*

The number of Pending provisions is the report's clearest measure of limited implementation. Many are long-term commitments that require constitutional amendment or institutional redesign, but most of the Charter had still produced no documented action after five months of the new government. The 33 items with recorded activity include progress, contestation, and reversal; they should not all be read as evidence of implementation.




Figure 9: Areas with Zero Activity

1. Constitution

Fifteen of the Charter's 84 primary provisions in the constitutional area remain Pending, covering the state language and identity provisions (1–2), foundational state principles (4–9), presidential powers and impeachment (10–13), Prime Ministerial tenure limits and restrictions on holding multiple positions (14–15), and constitutional anti-corruption provisions (43). These provisions span some of the most structurally important commitments in the Charter including the expansion of fundamental rights (Provision 9), the establishment of presidential independence in key appointments (Provision 11), and the constitutional prohibition on abuse of state power (Provision 43).

All 15 provisions in this cluster depend directly or indirectly on a constitutional amendment process. Neither the government's proposed parliamentary committee nor the opposition's preferred Constitutional Reform Council had been established by the end of July. The cluster therefore reflects one unresolved procedural dispute with multiple consequences rather than 15 unrelated failures.

2. Legislature

Six legislature provisions remain Pending. The Roles and Responsibilities of the Upper House (19), Qualifications and Disqualifications of Upper House Members (20), Women's Representation target of 100 seats (21), Chairpersons of Parliamentary Standing Committees from the opposition (24), Freedom of Members of Parliament to vote independently except on money bills and confidence votes (25), and Parliamentary Ratification of International Treaties (26).

Several of these provisions cannot operate until the upper house exists, while others require constitutional amendment. Progress therefore depends on both Provision 17, which would establish bicameralism, and Provision 3, which would determine the amendment procedure.

3. Electoral System and Election Commission

The electoral and Election Commission cluster includes several different types of Pending provision. Provision 28 on appointment of the Chief Justice requires constitutional amendment. Provisions 38 to 41 would create structured selection procedures for the Election Commission, Ombudsman, Public Service Commissions, and Comptroller and Auditor General. Provisions 44 to 48 concern local government elections, finance, staffing, and revenue.

The appointment-related provisions are notable because they would reduce direct executive control over several constitutional offices. During the same period, comparable reforms under Provisions 31, 42, and 52 were reversed or bypassed, while Provisions 38 to 41 were not initiated.

4. Judiciary

The judiciary area has the largest concentration of Pending provisions, 18 in total, spanning judicial appointments (28–30, 32), judicial conduct and removal (34–36), the Attorney General service (37), judicial codes of conduct (50–51), criminal investigation independence (53), judicial manpower and specialised courts (54), legal aid reform (55), asset declaration by judges (56), court digitalisation (57), legal reform and arbitration (58), codes of conduct for lawyers (59), and political allegiance of judges (61).

The judiciary combines the largest group of Pending provisions with three Binned provisions: 31, 52, and 60. Measures that had begun under the interim government were reversed, while most other judicial reforms did not start. At the midpoint, the area therefore showed both institutional rollback and broad inactivity.

5. Public Administration

The entire public administration reform area, all seven provisions (62–68) remains Pending. These provisions cover the Amendment to the Right to Information Act (62), the Official Secrets Act reform (63), the establishment of an independent commission to investigate officials involved in genocide and electoral fraud (64), the establishment of a permanent Public Administration Reform Commission (65), the creation of three separate Public Service Commissions (66), the separation of the audit and accounts departments (67), and the establishment of two new administrative divisions named Cumilla and Faridpur (68).

Public administration was the only reform area in which none of the seven provisions recorded activity. The inaction was not explained by a single sequencing requirement. It included politically significant commitments such as an investigation commission under Provision 64 and a permanent Public Administration Reform Commission under Provision 65.

6. Anti-Corruption

Fourteen of the fifteen anti-corruption provisions remain Pending, with only Provision 70 (prohibition of practices legitimizing illegitimate income) assessed as Ongoing on the basis of civil society engagement. The Pending provisions span some of the most specific and operationally actionable commitments in the Charter including the conflict of interest law (71), the beneficial ownership law (72), election financing transparency (73), asset disclosure by public representatives (74), party responsibility regarding corrupt candidates (75), amendments to the ACC Act (76–78), income tax information access for the ACC (79), private sector corruption as a punishable offence (80), Common Reporting Standards (81), the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (82), automation of service sector operations (83), and accession to the Open Government Partnership (84).

Several Pending anti-corruption provisions, including 73, 74, 75, 81, and 83, could be pursued through ordinary legislation or executive action. Their lack of progress, together with the Binned status of Provision 42 and the four-month vacancy in the ACC leadership, indicates that the anti-corruption agenda had not moved beyond limited public discussion.

7. Local Government Institutions

All four local government provisions (44–47) remain Pending. These cover elections to local government institutions under Election Commission supervision (44), financial management autonomy (45), delegation of government officials to elected local bodies (46), and independent fund generation by local government institutions (47).

All four local government provisions remained Pending. The absence of elected local bodies limited the immediate application of several commitments, but no documented step was taken even on Provision 44, which calls for local government elections under Election Commission supervision. The area received little attention during a period dominated by constitutional disputes.

Reform Area	Pending	Core Reason
Constitution	15	Upstream constitutional blockage
Legislature	6	Sequential dependency on bicameralism / Provision 3
Electoral / EC	7	Appointment powers and local govt cluster uninitiated
Judiciary	18	Largest stagnant area; reversals and inaction overlap
Public Administration	7	Complete policy vacuum
Anti-Corruption	14	Actionable reforms remain uninitiated
Local Government	4	No elected bodies / no documented engagement

Figure 10: Core Reasons for Pending Status

Conclusion

At the midpoint of the monitoring year, implementation of the July National Charter remained limited and uneven. Of the 114 trackable items, 81 were Pending, 9 Ongoing, 17 Partially Adopted, and 7 Binned. No item had been Fully Adopted. Activity was concentrated in a small number of constitutional, legislative, and judicial provisions, while public administration and local government recorded no progress.

The main procedural obstacle was the disagreement over constitutional reform. The government proposed a special parliamentary committee, while Jamaat-e-Islami, NCP, and their allies demanded a Constitution Reform Council based on the referendum mandate. Until that dispute is resolved, provisions requiring constitutional amendment or an upper house are unlikely to advance. At the same time, the large number of Pending short-term and administrative measures shows that the delay cannot be explained by the constitutional dispute alone.

The report also identifies several institutional reversals. Parliament repealed or allowed to lapse measures relating to judicial appointments, the Supreme Court Secretariat, the Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Independent Police Commission. In some cases, the ruling party had recorded dissent on the mechanism. In others, including the Supreme Court Secretariat and Police Commission, there was no recorded party disagreement. These cases raise questions about how consensus commitments are carried into ordinary legislative decision-making.

Civil society organisations, professional groups, and researchers played an important role in keeping women's representation, judicial independence, and anti-corruption commitments in public discussion. Their activity, however, did not produce formal implementation during the reporting period. The distinction between public advocacy and government action should therefore remain clear in future assessments.

The second half of the monitoring year will provide a clearer test of the government's approach. The Appellate Division's hearing on the Supreme Court Secretariat, future parliamentary sessions, and any renewed negotiation over the constitutional amendment mechanism may change several classifications. Reform Watch will review those developments in its monthly updates and final report in January 2027.

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Annex

List of Political Parties and Alliances Participating in the Formulation of the July National Charter 2025

- (1) 12-Party Alliance
- (2) Amjanatar Dal
- (3) Amar Bangladesh Party (AB Party)
- (4) Islami Andolan Bangladesh
- (5) Islami Oikya Jote
- (6) Khelafat Majlish
- (7) Gano Adhikar Parishad (GOP)
- (8) Ganatantrik Bam Oikya (Democratic Left Alliance)
- (9) Gano Forum
- (10) Ganasamhati Andolan
- (11) Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam Bangladesh
- (12) Jaker Party
- (13) Jatiya Ganofront
- (14) National Citizen Party (NCP)
- (15) Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD)
- (16) Jatiyatabadi Ganatantrik Andolan (NDM)
- (17) Jatiyatabadi Samomona Jote (Nationalist Like-minded Alliance)
- (18) Nagorik Oikya (Citizen Unity)
- (19) Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis
- (20) Bangladesh Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (Bangladesh JASAD)
- (21) Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)
- (22) Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami
- (23) Bangladesh Nezame Islam Party
- (24) Bangladesh Labour Party
- (25) Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB)
- (26) Revolutionary Communist League of Bangladesh
- (27) Bangladesh Shomajtantrik Dal (Socialist Party of Bangladesh) (Marxist)

- (28) Bangladesh Shomajtantrik Dal (Socialist Party of Bangladesh) (BASAD)
- (29) Bangladesh Shomajtantrik Dal (Socialist Party of Bangladesh) (BSP)
- (30) Revolutionary Workers Party of Bangladesh
- (31) Bhasani Janashakti Party
- (32) Rashtra Sanskar Andolan (State Reform Movement)
- (33) Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)